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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

1h

STATE OF UTAH

.UN1VERSITY UTl.H

D.A.V. CHAPTER No. 6; AMERICAN
LEGION POST 60; ·THE KENT CLUB;
THEM. & B. CLUB, Inc.; D.A.V. CHAPTER No. 11; CLUB LAUREE, all nonprofit corporations,
Plaintiffs,

vs.
SECRETARY OF STATE OF THE\
STATE OF UTAH ; LAMONT "~~
r:· ',~..,.,
TORONTO, duly elected official "'~>\ th~ ·
above office,
'7
Defendants.

PETITION OF PLAINTIFFS FOR REHEARING
AND SUPPORTING BRIEF

RAY S. McCARTY and
SUMNER J. HATCH
Attorneys for Plaintiffs and
Petitioners
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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
D.A.V. CHAPTER No. 6; AMERICAN
LEGION POST 60; THE KENT CLUB;
THEM. & B. CLUB, Inc.; D.A.V. CHAPTER No. 11; CLUB LAUREE, all nonprofit corporations,
Plaintiffs,
vs.

No. 8341

SECRETARY OF STATE OF THE
STATE OF UTAH ; LAMONT F.
TORONTO, duly elected official to the
above office,
Defendants.

PLAINTIFFS' PETITION FOR REHEARING
Plaintiffs and petitioners in the above entitled cause
respectfully petition the court for a rehearing in the
above entitled case, and request the court to vacate and
set aside its ruling of January 5, 1957, recalling and
quashing the writ granted on the 14th day of April,
1955, enjoining the Secretary of State of the State of
Utah from taking any action whatsoever under H. B. 16,
legislature of 1955.
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The petition is based on the following grounds:
A. The court erred in holding the legislation did
not contain more than one subject.
B. The court erred in holding the legislation was
not uncertain and ambiguous to the point of being unconstitutional.
C. The court erred in finding there was a constitutional delegation of legislative power under H. B. 16 as
distinguished from the legislation amended thereby.
D. The court erred in finding the act not discriminatory.
E. The court erred in holding that H. B. 16 did not
impair the obligations of contracts in an unconstitutional
manner.

CERTIFICATE OF COUNSEL
ON PETITION FOR REHEARING
The undersigned, one of the attorneys for the plaintiffs and petitioners, certifies in support of this petition
for r.ehearing that in his opinion there is good re~son to
believe that the opinion and judgment of thi.s court
heretofore rendered is erroneous and that the case ought
to be reexamined.

SUMNER J. HATCH
Attorney for Plaintiffs and
Petitioners
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

3
PLAINTIFFS' BRIEF ON REHEARING

A.
THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THE LEGISLATION

DID NOT CONTAIN MORE THAN ONE SUBJECT.

The court admits that the legislation in Chapter 25,
Session Laws of 1955, is for (a) the regulation, control
and revocation of charters of non-profit social clubs
(Court's Opinion, Paragraph A, subparagraph 2), and
(b) that it amends certain portions of the Liquor Control
Act, Title 32, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, (Court's
Opinion, Paragraph A, subparagraph 4)
"it will be found that that provisions of the Liquor
Control Act, Title 32, which are amended ... "
Admitting that the basic purpose of the law deals
with the regulation, control and revocation of charters
of non-profit social clubs, and that the provisions contained in the law and in the title amend at least two
sections of Title 32, can it be contended that in view of
State vs. Alta Club, 120 U. 121, 232 P(2) 759, that the
amendments to the Utah Liquor Control Act are in any
way part of the subject of the revocation, control and
regulation of charters of non-profit social clubs~
The amended act .states :
"The so-called 'locker system' for the storage
and serving of intoxicating liquors shall be legal
in this State only when operated by a non-profit
corporation in compliance with the terms of this
chapter."
The Alta Club case clearly holds that any legal
entity, be it corporation or individual, may store and
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consume beverages purchased from the right source, the
Utah Liquor Commission, in any place other than places
expressly prohibited by the Utah Liquor Control Act.
We contend that in any reasonable interpretation of Section 2 of H. B. 16 that the references to an amendment
to Title 32 are and must be a separate subject from the
regulation of .social clubs.
B.

THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THE LEGISLATION
WAS NOT UNCERTAIN AND AMBIGUOUS TO THE POINT
OF BEING UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

The court at B (paragraph one of the majority
opinion) after setting out several of the terms objected
to in the legislation as being ambiguous states:
"The emphasized terms above recited are
admittedly somewhat nebulous,"
and then sets forth rules from Peterson vs. Sundt, et ux,
67 Ariz. 312, 195 P ( 2) 158,
"Legislation should not be judicially declared
invalid on the ground that it is unintelligible or
uncertain unless it is so imperfect and deficient as
to render it susceptible of no reasonable construction that will give it effect, or the court finds itself
unable to divine the purpose and intent of the
Legislature,"
and setting forth from State vs. Packard, ____________u ____________ ,
250 P(2) 561:
"If the statute is so designed that persons of
ordinary intelligence, who would be law abiding,
can tell what their conduct must be to conform
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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to its requirements, and it is susceptible of uniform interpretation and applic.ation by those
charged with the responsibility of enforcing it, it
is invulnerable to an attack for vagueness."
Keeping in mind that in State vs. Packard, supra,
Mr. Justice Crockett in construing Section 49-1-29, U.C.A.
1943, which provides as follows :

"It is the duty of every person before commencing employment with any person, firm or
corporation whose employees are out on labor
strike called by a national recognized union to
register with the industrial commission of Utah,"
and in discussing the terms, "commencing employment"
and "called by a national recognized union," sets forth
at length decisions regarding the tests of what constitutes
such uncertainty or ambiguity as to render a statute
invalid and holds the legislation void due to ambiguity of
the emphasized phrases. In addition to the language used
in the prevailing opinion the court at headnote 4 of the
Packard case, supra, quotes from Connally vs. General
Construction Co., 269 U.S., 385, 46 S. Ct., 126, 127, 70 L.
ed. 322,

"'* * * a statute which either forbids or requires
the doing of an act in terms so vague that men
of common intelligence must necessarily guess
at its meaning and differ as to its .application
violates the first es.sential of due process of
law. * * *'"
and from City of Price vs. Jaynes, 113 Utah 89, 191 P(2)
606, 607,
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" 'the right * • * to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures shall not be violated' was
held so vague and uncertain that it did not define
a crime."
It should be noted in the Price vs. Jaynes case, supra,
the word "unreasonable" as referring to searches and
seizures is the same root word "reasonable" that is
one of the words used in several of the phrases objected
to in the instant legislation as being too ambiguous and
uncertain for interpretation or enforcement.
We are aware that the court sets forth in the case
at hand
"It is important to keep in mind that it pertains to the issuance and regulation of such charters and is not a criminal statute involving the
sanctions of punishment for crime for failure to
comply with it.s provisions,"
and we feel it necessary to point out relative to this
statement that as late as December, 1956, in State vs.
Ledkens, __________ Utah __________ , 303 P(2) 1099, this court held,
with four justices concurring, and one concurring in the
result, that
"The same basic rules apply to statutory construction of criminal and civil statutes,"
and
"The rule of strict construction of penal
statutes does not apply in Utah and hence there
is no makeweight in favor of a penal statute in
determining the effect of partial invalidity."
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We also point out that the court fails to consider in
its discussion of ambiguity and uncertainty that by failure to comply with what the Secretary of State or one of
his successors considers to be reasonable, consistent,
suitable, etc., all the clubs or any of them, with no misfeasance on their part whatsoever, may be deprived of
property in the nature of a charter and a $5,000.00 bond
forfeiture.
Using the rules applied by the court in the majority
opinion from Peterson vs. Sundt, supra, and State vs.
Packard, supra, together with the further citations in
this brief taken from State vs. Packard, can it be said
that the legislation being construed contains that certainty or lack of ambiguity necessary to constitutionality1
Are the fourteen regulations required by the statute
so designed that persons of ordinary intelligence who
would be law-abiding can tell what their conduct must
be to conform to the requirements 1 Is it susceptible to
uniform application and interpretation by the present
Secretary of State and those succeeding him in office~
This court in the Packard case, supra, at paragraph
7, page 564, sets forth the test a statute must meet to be
valid, as follows:
"It must be sufficiently definite (a) to inform
persons of ordinary intelligence, who would be
law abiding, what their conduct must be to conform to its requirements; (b) to advise a defendant accused of violating it just what constitutes the offense with which he is charged, and
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(c) to be su.sceptible of uniform interpretation
and application by those charged with responsibility of applying and enforcing it."
Can it be contended that the legislation being contested fits these rules when applied as a whole or applied
to the fourteen numbered requirements~ Is .such a guide
set up as to inform the person of ordinary intelligence
what his conduct must be~ Does it inform him of what
offenses are constituted which he must steer clear of,
and is it susceptible of uniform application by the one
administrative official charged with enforcing the law
and his successors~
The law as written, in leaving to the Secretary of
State the full power to interpret and apply the regulations set out in Section 2 of H. B. 16, puts that administrative official in the same position as Humpty Dumpty
in Carroll's "Alice in Wonderland," quoted by eminent
courts in many opinions, and last quoted by Cecil Sims
in his excellent article in the January issue of the American Bar Association Journal, Vol. 43, page 33 :
"When I used a word," Humpty Dumpty said in a
rather scornful tone, "It means just what I choose it to
mean - neither more nor less."
"The question is," said Alice, "Whether you can
make words mean so many different things."
"The question is," .said Humpty Dumpty, "Which
is to be the master- that's all."
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c.
THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING THERE WAS A CONSTITUTIONAL DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWER
UNDER H. B. 16 AS DISTINGUISHED FROM THE LEGISLATION AMENDED THEREBY.

The court in the main opinion under paragraph C
discusses the question of delegation of a judicial function and falls back on Citizens Club vs. Welling, 83 U.
81, 27 P(2) 23, and Entre Nous Cl~tb vs. Toronto,
____________u. ____________ , 287 P(2) 670, together with A. R. Young
Constntction Co. vs. Dunne, 123 Kans. 176, 254 P. 323,
as authority for its position. These cases are readily distinguishable from the instant case. In each of the above
cases, the court is adjudicating a situation where the
administrative revocation of a corporate charter was
based on violation of conditions in the legislation in
existence when the corporate charters were issued, and
in each case the revocation took away nothing but the
charters which had been issued under legislation which
also provided for revocation under the "Lord giveth and
the Lord taketh away" doctrine set forth in the Young
Construction Co. vs. Dunne, supra.
It is important to note that in all three of the cited
cases revocations were had after opportunity for hearing,
and that the revocation of the Dunne case was for failure
to pay franchise fees as required by the legislation for
continuing the charter and the administrative board's
function was the ministerial act of checking the books
of account in order to make a determination of payment
or non-payment; the board used no discretion in its act
whatsoever.
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This court states further in the main opinion :
"In view of the fact that this court is committed to the proposition decided in Citizens Club
vs. Welling and Entre N ous Club vs. Toronto
both supr.a, we are not now disposed to reconside;
such rulings,"
and in doing so .apparently ignored the following propositions that distinguish those cases from the instant ca.se.
First, both decisions cited are under the section of
the statute repealed by the present legislation, which is
vastly different from the present legislation.
Second, in both prior decisions with the allowed
revocation clause was in existence at the time of the issuance of the charter being revoked, and the revocation was
for breach of a condition contained in the law at the
time the charter was issued.
In contrast, all the plaintiffs in the present case had
eharters existing and in operation at the time the l.aw
being construed was passed, and none of the plaintiff
clubs have "voluntarily elected to apply for and receive
privileges from the State," nor have they submitted to
new regulations to keep prior privileges. Each was incorpor.ated long prior to the objectionable legislation, and
had they voluntarily submitted to the new conditions,
the original writ from which this petition arise.s would
never have been filed.
Third, in the three cases cited, the only forfeitures
were (a) revocation of a charter previously granted by
the State in the two Utah cases for violation of a criminal
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statute prohibiting gambling and a criminal statute prohibiting the sale of liquor, both statutes being in existence
when the charters were granted, and (b) in the Kansa.s
case for a clear-cut failure to pay franchise fees required
by legislation under which the charter was issued, each
case coming under the Young Construction Co. vs. Dunne
case, supra:
"The corporation owed its existence to the
state. The powers and privilege of the corporation
were conferred upon conditions imposed by the
legislature . . . when the corporation accepted
the charter, it consented to ... the conditions ...
and the statute itself became a part of the corporate contract."
In the instant ca.se, the legislature enlarges the requirements by requiring fourteen new and additional
acts as set forth by H. B. 16, many of which by the
court's own statement are "admittedly somewhat nebulous," and c.an in no way meet the language in Young
Construction vs. Dunne case supra, "by acts and omissions which the legislature has in plain terms declared
shall operate as a forfeiture."

It is not only the failure of the legislature to spell
out the procedure of inquiry and forfeiture which is
abhorrent to constitutionality, but its failure to set out
an adequate guide for the clubs to know what they are
expected to comply with and at the same time for the
administrative official to determine what constitutes a
violation.
In addition to the conditions above discussed is the
requirement of .a $5,000.00 bond of a penal nature, which
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was not required of these plaintiffs as a condition of
their charters, and it may be forfeited to the general
fund of the State by the unguided decision of an administrative official under the "admittedly somewhat nebulous" requirements set forth in the legislation.
Also the court must consider that the amended legislation, while making new requirements of existing cluh~
in order to keep a charter already issued, does not in
reality grant any privileges whatsoever, the clubs having
prior to the legislation had the power, along with individuals and other entities, to store and consume alcoholic
beverages in places not interdicted by the Utah Liquor
Control Act, Title 32, Utah Code Annotated, 1953. See
State vs. Alta Club, 120 U. 121, 232 P(2) 759.
D.
THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE ACT NOT DISCRIMINATORY.

The court in holding that the act is not discriminatory seems to ignore several factors. First, Title 16,
Chapter 6, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, is legislation providing for the incorporation and control of non-profit
corporations, and provide.s for temporal and spiritual
corporations as well as social, athletic and recreational,
and H. B. 16 amending parts of Title 16, Chapter 6,
U.C.A. 1953, applies to that class of entity or corporation.
However, Section 1 of the amendatory act limits the nonprofit corporations affected to social, athletic, recreational or kindred associations, ignoring the other types
of non-profit corporation.s. Section 2 futher limits the
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class purporting to be regulated by providing that a
$5,000.00 bond must be furnished by those corporations
set forth in Section 1, which now m.aintain or intend to
maintain premises on which liquor would be stored or
consumed.
This court in State vs. Alta Club, supra, holds that
non-profit corporation.s, together with other entities, may
store or serve alcoholic beverages on such premises as
are not expressly interdicted by Title 32, Utah Code
Annotated, 1953. Section 2 of the present legislation
limits the requirement of a bond only to those who .affirmatively express an intent to consume or serve liquor.
Section 2 goes on to require the fourteen additional requirements only for those clubs as are required to post
and keep in effect the $5,000.00 bond, thus leaving a
situation wherein those who profess an intent to store
or consume liquor mu.st comply with the act, and upon
violation of any crimin.al statute or on failure to comply
with the Secretary of State's idea of what constitutes
compliance with the fourteen regulations are subject to
loss of charter, loss of bond, and criminal prosecution
of any violation of a statute, while .a similar non-profit
corporation which denies an intent to store or allow
liquor to be consumed on its premises may allow such
storage or con.sumption under State vs. Alta Club, supra,
allow gambling or other penal code violations, and in doing so remain free from the fourteen regulations, and on
a prosecution for violation of the criminal law be subject to only a misdemeanor penalty and loss of charter.
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The court indicates that this amendment as to the
$5,000.00 bond ignores two factors, one being that for a
misden1eanor there may be both a fine and a jail sentence
imposed. We fail to find under the laws of this jurisdiction any instance in which a j.ail sentence may be imposed
against a corporation. Secondly, the court contend.s the
bond is voluntarily furnished by the plaintiffs as a condition to receiving privileges .afforded under the statute,
and that the plaintiffs need not subject themselves to
such penalty unless they so de.sire. This statement completely ignores the fact that all of the plaintiff corporations prior to the passage of H. B. 16 had been granted
charters by the State and were validly operating under
said charters .and the ruling of State vs. Alta Club, supra,
and that the statute coerces them into providing the
bond or into falsely denying that they intend to store
or serve liquor on their premises.
The object of the regulation is undoubtedly to control
the sale of liquor by non-profit organizations, and the
provisions of Title 32, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, apply
equally to the entity constituted by non-profit corporations, the individual, the partnership, or the corporation
for profit. There can be no doubt under the Alta Club
decision that an individual person or other entity may
store and serve alcoholic beverages in any place not expressly prohibited by the provisions of Title 32, and that
Title 32 applies equally to all classes, and that the $5,000.00 bond and additional regulations applicable only
to a portion of the class set up by Title 16, Chapter 6,
are purely discriminatory and unreasonable, the danger
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therein lying not from violations of the Liquor Control
Act or other criminal statutes, but lying in the fourteen
regulations which as drawn are impossible to interpret
so as to give assurance of compliance.
This court cites as authority that the requirement
of the bond is not unjust discrimination the case of
Freshgrown Preserves Corp., et al., vs. U. 8., 144 Fed.
(2) 136, 139, which is a case where a $1,000.00 bond was
set by the government upon returning confiscated mislabeled preserves to the company which issued them with
the express conditions of the bond being set out to insure
that the company after regaining the chat1tels would
properly relabel and arrange ,a federal inspection of the
merchandise before reshipping. The bond was forfeited
only after failure to comply with the express conditions
to the individual case. That bond being required after
an infraction of the law and conditioned to rectify the
infraction cannot properly be compared with the bond
in this case, conditioned not only to compliance with
our penal code as a whole but as to compliance with
nebulous regulation.s set forth by the contested legislation under which no person can be sure, despite good
faith and attempted compliance, that his bond is not
in jeopardy.

E.
THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT H. B. 16 DID
NOT IMPAIR THE OBLIGATIONS OF CONTRACTS IN AN
UNCONSTITUTIONAL MANNER.

While it is admitted as discussed in Point C of this
brief that the legislature may require compliance with
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certain conditions set forth at the time of issuance of a
charter, it is an improper and unconstitutional impairment of contract, even in view of the most liberal proper
use of the police power, for a legislative act to impair and
jeopardize contracts not in the future but existing at the
time of the effective date of the legislation, as in the
instant case.
The requirement, for example, that where a club
lease.s premises, it must have a lease for a minimum of
one year has the effect of either forfeiting the charter
of the club or requiring breach of its lease for a lesser
time in order to comply with the regulation. This is not
reasonable. Further, the requirements limiting serving of
food and beverages cuts acros.s contracts presently in
existence .and has no reasonable relationship to the use
of police power in regulating the clubs. The Utah Liquor
Control Act contains express provisions making the
criminal law relative thereto pertain both to the individual, be he .servant, master or corporate officer, and
upon a violation by an employe or independent contractor
upon the premises imputes liability to the owner or
possessor of s:aid premises, be he individual or corporation. See Sections 32-8-7, 32-8-13, 32-8-14, and 32-8-15,
Utah Code Annotated, 1953.
The court states that:
"They indeed have the same constitutional
rights of property and contract as all other
citizens, but they have no constitutional right to
store and serve liquor on their premises. If they
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desire to continue to enjoy this privilege, they
must so conduct their affairs as to comply with
the legal regulations pertaining thereto."
We again cite State vs. Alta Club, supra.
The cases are clear that the right rto contract 1s
a basic right assured by the constitution, and the constitution expressly forbids impairment of contracts. Under
the guise of police power the legislation contested in
regulation 10, 11 and 14, Section 2, Chapter 25, Session
Laws of 1955, not only denies the right to contract in the
future to the plaintiffs but cuts directly across the rights
and obligations under pre-existing contracts with cruterters, landlords and the State. Where and in what w.ay
can the general welfare require that twelve month leases,
abrogation of existing caJtering services, or termination
of existing employment contr,acts, on the basis of regulation of social or athletic clubs~ The right to have valid
contracts unimpared and the right to collltract granted
to all by the con.stitution and to the plaintiff clubs by
Section 16-6-8, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, is a basic
and assured right. As stated by this court in State vs.
Packard, supra, at page 563 of the Pacific citation:
"Admittedly, the right is not absolute. It may
be limited by reasonable regulations correlated
with the general welfare ... But even for such
proper purpo.se, great caution must be observed
in permitting encroachments upon basic rights,
assured by the constitution, and such restriction
c.an be effected only in accordance with constitutional prerogatives and where clearly expressed
standards are set up."
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CONCLUSION
This petition is a request that the court review Chapter 25, Session Laws of Utah, 1955, in its entirety, together
with the prevailing opinion and the two di.ssenting opinions constituting the court's decision quashing the original writ. The legislation is such that five justices of
this court differ greatly as to whether the legislation
is valid not on one point but on five, as evidenced by
the dissenting opinions. Even the writer of the majority
opinion expresses a doubt from time to time, admitting
in Paragraph A that the purpose of the law is for the
control of the clubs, including the plaintiffs, and also
admitting that amendments were made to Title 32, an
unrelated act, affirmatively stating that the terms
claimed to be ambiguous and uncertain were "admittedly
somewhat nebulous," quoting extensively from State vs.
Packard as authority to overcome the vague language of
the law with the realization that the terms construed
and found by this court to be so vague and uncertain
in the Packard case as to be unconstitutional were equally
as capable of interpretation by the ordinary person as
the terms objected to herein; and then to differentiate
between the present case and the Packard case pointing
out that the Packard case involved a criminal statute
and the case of D.A.V. et al. vs. Toronto is a civil case,
this in the face of this court's recent opinion on statutory
construction in State vs. Ledkens, supra.
The prevailing opinion with regard to delegation
of a judicial function falls back on the Entre N ous vs.
Toronto case, supra, and Citizens Club v. Welling, supra,
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admittedly decided under a different statute repealed
by this law, but apparently fails to take into consideration the fact that all the plaintiff clubs were existing and
chartered by the State prior to the contested legislation.
In Paragraph D the court attempts to overcome the
exorbitant nature of the $5,000.00 penal bond on the basis
that a misdemeanor which applies to other entities and
the clubs alike may provide for .a jail sentence in addition
to a fine, but in doing so overlooks the fact that no jail
sentence is or ean be applicable to a corporation under
the laws of this State, and also on the basis thrut the
bonds are voluntarily furnished as a condition to the
receipt of privileges when the plaintiffs already po.ssesed
these privileges, together with all other entities under this
court's decision in State vs. Alta Club, supra.
In Paragraph E, the cour·t admits that the law impairs not only the right of the clubs to contract in the
future, but impairs presently existing contracts under
the ·exercise of police power, but with no basis to show
where such impairment enhances or affects general
morals and welfare. This legislation, if held constitutional, is a dangerous precedent, and under the guise of
reasonable exercise of the police power, and without a
showing of necessity to protect the public morals or welfare, it runs roughshod over some of the most valuable
rights guaranteed by the Constitution of the United
States and the State of Utah, including the right to due
process, the right to be advised by law understandable to
the ordinary person as to what his conduct must be to
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avoid conflict with the law, the right to contract without
fear of legislative impairment, and the right to a hearing
before judge and jury. And to what purpose~
As Justice Henriod points out in his dissentinO'b
opinion, this legislation does not tend to curb consumption of liquor. The legi.slation must be aimed at one of
two ends: (a) Elimination of sale of alcoholic beverages,
or (b) elimination of the less affluent social and athletj('
clubs, and in so eliminating enhance the coffers of the
State at the rate of $5,000.00 per whack.
If (a) above is the aim, the legisl8!ture has heretofore
fortified and protected the public morals and welfare in
an adequate manner by the Liquor Control Act, Title
32, which applies to all persons, both individual and
corporate, without discrimination, provides for due process, for judicial trial, and does not impair the right of
contract, and does not abuse the police power to a point
of creating the first large srtep towards the police state.
If (b) above is the purpose of the legislature, this legislation will effect that purpose and in doing so create
a long and chaotic episode during which victim clubs will
fumble and grope in an attempt to comply with regulations they cannot understand and will finally go under
.as the Secretary of State in an honest effort to comply
without a guide with nebulous duties under the law revokes charters and forfeits bonds because the regulations
of the "skid row" club do not appear to be consistent
with those of the millionaire "tennis and polo" club,
and the skid row club mus~t be in violation because the
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Secretary has nothing whatsoever to guide him and the
polo club cannot be wrong because it has been established
since the turn of the century and its members are such
fine, upstanding, well-heeled folk.
On the basis of the above consideration, we respectfully ask that ,a rehearing be allowed, thart the temporary
writ be reinst~ated, and further proceedings and consideration be permitted in the above matter.

Respectfully submitted,
RAY S. ~1cCARTY and
SUMNER J. HATCH
Attorneys for Plaintiffs and
Petitioners
409 Boston Building
Salt Lake City 11, Utah
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